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1.  Introduction: Demand or Supply driven Depressions?  
If official statistics are to be believed, the fall in output in the transition economies of 
Central and Eastern Europe has probably been the largest anywhere in peacetime in modern 
history (failed harvests could cause even larger falls in agricultural societies, and such 
effects were felt on a national level as late as 1854 in Ireland). This fall in output was 
certainly noticeably larger than that which occurred during the Great Depression of the 
1930s (compare Tables 7 and 8-10), although it was smaller than that during World War II 
in countries which served as battlegrounds (France in 1944, Germany and Japan in 1945). It 
is therefore important to know what the cause of the post-Communist depressions was. Two 
main explanations have been put forward, the first posits a sharp reduction in the level of 
aggregate demand as the cause, the second suggests a dramatic change in the structure of 
demand, to which supply was unable to respond sufficiently rapidly. 
 On the demand based view, the anti-inflationary policies pursued by reformist 
governments resulted in excessive tightening in monetary and fiscal policies, and via high 
real interest rates and/or reductions in budget deficits caused sharp falls in aggregate 
demand, which in turn caused output to collapse (e.g. Laski and Bhaduri,1993). The supply-
side approach starts from the large increase in the relative prices of energy and other inputs 
(and the fall in the relative prices of agricultural products), which resulted from price 
liberalization. This led to many production processes becoming loss making, and having to 
be discontinued. Due to various rigidities many resources became permanently useless, 
while others had to remain idle until until they were redeployed or improved. Since  the 
required micro-adjustments were large, the post-Communist depressions were inevitable. If, 
in the transition, aggregate demand was not reduced to correspond to the level of the (much 
reduced) sustainable aggregate supply, then countries suffered very high inflation as well as 
great depression, as in Russia or Ukraine (Gomulka, 1993). 
  If the demand based explanations are correct, we would expect the fall in investment 
during the transition to be far greater than the fall in GDP, with a resulting fall in the 
investment/GDP ratio. This follows both from theory and empirical observation.  Investment in Post-communist Economies... 
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 In a simple accelerator model, the optimal capital stock is proportional to the 
expected output level: 
(1)    K*=  υY2 
If today’s capital stock is optimal, investment will be undertaken to offset depreciation 
and to match any expected increase in output: 
(2)    I1 = K* - K1 + δK1 =  υ(Y2 - Y1) + δK1 
 Thus, a change in national income causes a matching change in the capital stock. 
Since the capital output ratio is usually between 2 and 3, and investment is between 15% 
and 30% annual of GDP, a 10% increase in expected (permanent) GDP would lead to a 100-
200% increase in investment, if the whole of the increase in the capital stock had to take 
place in one period. Equally, a fall of permanent GDP by 10% would lead to the complete 
elimination of investment. In fact, since the adjustment of the capital stock does not need to 
take place in one year, and since not every increase or fall in output is believed by 
businesses to be a change in permanent output, there is no need for the changes in 
investment to be quite as violent as suggested by such a very simple model. Nevertheless, in 
western market economies changes in investment are usually several times larger than the 
changes in output which they accompany. This is documented in Section 2 for some major 
OECD countries in the post-War period (both at the aggregate and sectoral levels) and in 
Section 3 for the major capitalist countries during the Great Depression of the 1930s. In 
Section 4 the experience of the post-Communist economies is compared with that in the 
West during the Great Depression. It is found that although (according to official statistics) 
the output collapse was in general larger during the transition crisis, investment fell by far 
less (Figures 1 and 2 and Tables 7-9). 
  The behaviour of investment and of its components during the transition in Poland is 
examined in Section 5. It can be seen to be incompatible with both the predictions of the 
aggregate demand based explanation of the post-Communist depression in that country, and 
with the experience of market economies, both in the post-War period and during the Great 
Depression. Instead of observing a massive fall in the investment/GDP ratio, as we would 
expect as a result of the excess capacity which should accompany an aggregate demand 
driven depression, investment/GDP actually increased during the transition in Poland J. Rostowski 
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(Figure 1). What is more, this ratio increased very sharply in those sectors in which one 
would expect there to be a particular need for fixed assets to be restructured - namely, in 
industry and commerce. Also significant is the fact that investment in machinery and 
equipment rose even more than total investment relative to output, both in the economy as 
whole and in industry and commerce in particular. On the other hand agriculture, where 
there was less possibility of restructuring, and which suffered a massive terms of trade 
shock, experienced a fall in the investment/output ratio similar to that of the US economy 
during the Great Depression.  
  Even in the post-Communist countries in which investment falls relative to GDP, this 
fall is far smaller than the experience of the western market economies would lead us to 
expect (see Figure 2 for a comparison of Russia during 1989-93 with the United States 
1929-33). This suggests that, even in these countries (the Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Romania, Russia, Ukraine), reductions in aggregate demand can not provide a full 
explanation of the transition depression
(1), and that supply side effects are an important part 
of what happened (Sections 6 and 7). 
 
2. The Behaviour of Components of National Income and of 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation during the Business Cycle in 
Selected OECD Countries. 
  Recently a number of studies have shown that in the post-war period fluctuations in 
investment have been highly positively correlated with fluctuations in national income, but 
that the amplitude of the investment fluctuations is far greater than that of the national 
income fluctuations (some 2.5 to 4.8 times greater). Kydland and Prescott (1990) have 
shown that in the United States quarterly fluctuations in total investment, fixed investment, 
non-residential fixed investment and non-residential fixed investment in equipment were all 
strongly correlated with quarterly fluctuations in real GNP
(2) (Table 1). Not only was the 
correlation very high (between 0.80 and 0.91) but also the variability of investment was far 
greater than that of GNP. Thus, whereas the standard deviation of real GNP was 1.71%, that 
of fixed investment was 5.38%, that of investment in equipment 6.21% and that of total Investment in Post-communist Economies... 
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investment 8.30%. Thus, if the growth rate of GNP fell by 1 percent there was a very high 
probability that the growth rates of various categories of investment would also fall, but by 
several times that amount. Blackburn and Ravn (1992) obtained similar results for the UK 
for the period 1956-90 (Table 2)
(3). 
  Burda and Wyplosz (1993) confirm the greater variability of investment than of GDP 
for Australia, Canada and Japan during 1970-91 (also on the basis of quarterly data). In 
Tables 3 to 6 we report analogous annual data for gross domestic product and gross fixed 
capital formation for 1971-92 for Germany, Italy, France and the UK
(4). In order to make the 
data more comparable to that of the post-communist economies, annual rather than quarterly 
data were used. More importantly, a number of categories of investment which are more 
relevant to the comparison with post-communist economies were included:  
1. gross fixed capital formation of machinery and equipment in the economy as a 
whole; 
2. gross fixed capital formation in manufacturing; 
3. gross fixed capital formation in construction; 
4. gross fixed capital formation in agriculture; 
5. gross fixed capital formation of equipment in manufacturing (UK only). 
 
  In all four countries fluctuations in total gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) and in 
gross fixed capital formation of machinery and equipment (GFCF-E) are positively 
correlated with contemporaneous annual fluctuations in real GDP. The correlations range 
from 0.78 for GFCF and 0.78 for GFCF-E in the UK to 0.51 and 0.36 respectively in 
Germany. Again the amplitude of the fluctuations was far larger for both GFCF and GFCF-
E than for GDP, with the standard deviations ranging from 2.3 times as large for GFCF as 
for GDP in the UK, to 4.3 times as large for GFCF-E (compared to the standard deviation of 
GDP) in Germany.  
  When we look at the picture within the major productive sectors of the economy, the 
correlation of GFCF in manufacturing (GFCF-M) to gross value added in manufacturing 
(GVA-M) was quite high in the UK and Italy (0.64 and 0.63), much lower in France (0.30) J. Rostowski 
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and almost zero in Germany (0.08). Again, the standard deviation of GFCF-M was far 
higher than that of GVA-M: being 3.6 times in the UK, 3.5 times in Germany, 2.8 times in 
France and 2.2 times in Italy. Fluctuations in gross fixed capital formation of machinery and 
equipment in manufacturing (GFCF-E-M) was quite strongly correlated with GVA-M in the 
UK, the only country for which it was available, at 0.61, and it had a standard deviation 
which was 2.4 times as great as that of GVA-M.   
 Gross fixed capital formation in construction (GFCF-C) was positively correlated 
with contemporaneous GVA in construction in all four countries, most strongly in Germany 
(0.65) and least strongly in the UK (0.25). Gross fixed capital formation in agriculture 
(GFCF-A) was hardly correlated at all with contemporaneous GVA in agriculture (except in 
the UK where the correlation was 0.47). In both the UK and Italy, however, GFCF-A was 
more strongly correlated with GVA-A in the subsequent year, showing that it is a lagging 
indicator, even with annual data. Again, however, the standard deviation of GFCF-A was 
considerably larger than that of GVA-A. 
 
  There are three possible interpretations of these relationships:  
  1) Tightening of macroeconomic policy leads to a fall in the growth rate of national 
income, causing the appearance of excess capacity, which in turn causes a larger fall 
in the rate of GFCF. 
  2) Increases in interest rates cause a fall in the rate of GFCF, which causes a smaller 
fall in the growth rate of national income (investment demand is only a fraction of 
aggregate demand)
(5). 
 3) Investment opportunities decline as a result of a fall in the rate of technical 
innovation, leading to a fall in GFCF, which in turn leads to a smaller fall in the rate 
of growth of national income because investment is only a fraction of national output 
(a real business cycle hypothesis). 
 As we shall see, as far as comparison with, and analysis of, the behaviour of 
investment in some post-communist countries is concerned, it does not matter which of 
these explanations is correct for developed market economies.  Investment in Post-communist Economies... 
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3. The Behaviour of Investment During the Great Depression 
of 1929-33. 
  Table 7 shows the behaviour of real GDP, real investment and (in some cases) real 
GFCF and real GFCF in machinery and equipment (GFCF-E)  between 1929 and 1933 in 
Australia, Canada, Germany, Italy, Sweden, the United States and the United Kingdom 
(data was not available for other countries
(6)). The countries fall into two groups. The first, 
consisting of the USA, Canada and Germany, suffered falls in national income which are 
comparable to those in the transition economies (see Table 8). On the other hand, the second 
group (the UK, Australia, Italy and Sweden) suffered much smaller declines. In both 
groups, however, real investment, real GFCF and real GFCF-E fell by several times more 
than real national income. In the first group real gross investment fell some 2.7 to 2.8 times 
as much as the fall in national income, whereas in those countries in which the depression 
was less severe the fall in gross investment relative to the fall in national income was much 
larger (between 2.8 and 6.5 times). For those countries for which we have real GFCF 
(Australia, the UK and the USA), it fell by slightly less than real gross investment, but still 
by several times more than real GDP (by 6 times, 2.8 times and 2.5 times respectively). We 
have real GFCF-E only for the UK and the USA, and again the decline was much larger 
than the decline in real GDP - 4.6 times for the UK and 2.3 times for the USA. 
 In the United States gross national product fell a cumulative 29.8% in real terms, 
while gross investment fell 84.5%. Real GFCF fell 74% and real GFCF-E fell slightly less, 
by 69.9%. Thus by 1933 investment expenditure per unit of national income had fallen to 
22% of its 1929 level, GFCF to 40.3% of that level, and GFCF-E to 43%. In Canada the 
results of the great depression on real GDP and real gross investment were almost identical 
to those in the US
(7). In Germany real GDP fell by 23.5% between 1929 and 1932 (the 
trough of the depression in terms of national income). During that time investment 
expenditures fell 63.5%, so that investment per unit of national income fell to 48% of its 
1929 level
(8). 
  In the UK real GDP fell 5% between 1929 and 1932 (the trough year) while gross 
investment fell 17.6%
(9). In Australia real GDP fell 7.9% and gross investment fell 51.5% J. Rostowski 
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between 1929 and 1931 
(10). In Italy national income fell only in 1930. In that year real GDP 
fell 7% while investment fell 28%. In Sweden real GDP only fell between the years 1930 
and 1932. In that time real GDP fell 11.9%, while real investment fell 33.2%.  
  There are two commonly presented interpretations of these facts:  
  1) the Monetarist: the unintended tightening of the monetary stance in 1929 lead  to  a 
sharp fall in national income, causing the appearance of a large amount of excess 
capacity, which in turn caused an even larger fall in investment and GFCF. 
  2) the Keynesian: an initial fall in investment demand and GFCF was the trigger. It 
caused a (smaller) fall in national income, which in turn caused a further fall in 
investment and GFCF, since firms with excess capacity had little reason to invest. 
 
 
4.  The Behaviour of Investment During the Transition Crisis of 
1989-93. 
 Data was obtained on gross investment and national income for eight post-
Communist economies. Tables 8-10 show that all the countries suffered declines in GDP 
which were similar in size to those experienced by the three economies in our sample which 
were severely affected by the great depression of the 1930s (Canada, Germany and the 
United States). The smallest loss of GDP (from the beginning of the transition to the trough) 
was suffered by Poland at 17.8%, while the largest was suffered by Bulgaria at 41.3%. The 
post-Communist countries fall into two groups: one in which gross investment fell by less 
than GDP, and another in which it fell by more. Bulgaria, Poland and Slovakia belong to the 
first group, while the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Russia and Ukraine belong to the 
second.  
  It is clearly impossible to account for the fall in economic activity in the countries of 
the first group by a shortage of aggregate demand, as many writers have done [e.g. 
Kolodko, 1992, Laski and Bhaduri, 1993]. Such a fall in aggregate demand should have led 
to the appearance of excess capacity and therefore to a decline of gross investment steeper 
than that of output. But this did not happen in these three transition countries.  Investment in Post-communist Economies... 
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 Particularly striking is the fact that in the post-Communist countries there is no 
inverse relationship between the size of the fall in GDP and the ratio of the fall in 
investment to the fall in GDP, as there is in our sample of countries from the Great 
Depression (Table 7). What we observe in the Great Depression is that when we look across 
countries, the greater the percentage fall in GDP the greater the percentage fall in 
investment, but with a declining percentage increment. The explanation of this phenomenon 
is probably quite straightforward. The investment aggregate used is gross investment or 
gross fixed capital formation. The greater the percentage fall in GDP and in investment, the 
smaller the remaining investment is relative to the economy’s existing capital stock, and 
therefore the larger the proportion of any investment which goes to offsetting the 
depreciation of the existing capital stock. Since offsetting depreciation is likely to involve 
less risk than creating new capital, one would expect such investment to be more resistant to 
reduction (even as a result of falls in aggregate demand) than is investment in new capital. 
The absence of such a phenomenon in the transition economies suggests that investing in 
offsetting the depreciation of the existing capital stock is no less risky than investing in new 
capital. This in turn indicates the importance of relative rather than aggregate demand shifts. 
 
5.  The Boom within the Slump: the Behaviour of Components 
of National Income and of Investment during the Transition to a 
Market Economy in Poland. 
 
  In Poland during 1989 to 1993 we get a quite different history of the behaviour of 
investment and national income and their components than one would expect  on the basis 
of Western experience (Table 9). Whereas GDP fell by 18.3% between 1989 and 1991, 
gross fixed investment (GFI) fell by only 13.8%, so that GFI expenditures per unit of 
national income actually rose by 4%, rather than falling dramatically.  
 Even more striking are the results for the relationship between investment and 
national income by main branches of output. When we look at the main sectors of output we 
see a divergence between those sectors in which investment fell more than GDP produced in J. Rostowski 
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that sector (construction and transport) or where investment fell sharply even though GDP 
produced increased (agriculture), and those where it either fell far less than GDP produced 
(industry) or where it increased by more than GDP produced (commerce). Thus, whereas 
GDP produced in industry fell 35.4% between 1989 and 1991, GFI in industry fell only 
14%, so that GFI per unit of GDP increased by 33%! This contrasts with the much larger 
standard deviation of GFCF in manufacturing than of GVA in manufacturing
(11) which we 
find in the post-War period in all of the Western European countries described in Section 2, 
and the quite strong positive correlation between the two variables which we find in three of 
the four countries described. (Unfortunately, we did not find data for GFI in industry during 
the Great Depression for any of the countries.) 
  How can these facts be explained? For those who hold to a Keynesian explanation 
according to which both national income and investment declined in Poland as a result of a 
decline in aggregate demand, the facts regarding GFI in industry become if anything even 
more difficult to explain when one notes that although GFI in construction and transport did 
indeed decline more than the GDP produced in those sectors, it did so by only very slightly 
more. 
 On the other hand, these facts are explicable by the hypothesis that the 
comprehensive liberalization and imposition of hard budget constraints, which lay at the 
core of the Balcerowicz Plan in Poland in 1990, constituted a massive real shock to 
enterprises - equivalent to a block of technical innovations - which affected the various 
productive sectors of the Polish economy in different ways. Such an approach makes it 
possible to understand why investment in Polish industry per unit of GDP produced in that 
sector increased sharply instead of falling, as would have been suggested by the aggregate 
demand based approach. Industrial firms realized that they were not suffering from excess 
capacity - as would indeed have been the case if the problem had been a shortage of 
aggregate demand. Instead it is our belief that they were suffering from a shortage of the 
right kind of productive capacity, and therefore they needed to invest in order to increase 
such capacity. The ability of the firms to invest was, however, limited by the fall in revenue 
which they faced due to the restrictive macroeconomic policy which was a key part of the 
Balcerowicz Plan, and which was necessary in order to impose hard budget constraints on 
the firms in the first place. Together with the fact that Poland had reneged on its Investment in Post-communist Economies... 
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international debt payments already in 1981 - so that Polish firms did not have access to 
international capital markets - this may explain why GFI in industry fell in absolute terms 
instead of perhaps increasing in the face of the fall in capacity. 
 Such a "real shocks" approach to the behaviour of GDP and GFI in the Polish 
transition is also supported by the behaviour of GFI in machinery and equipment (GFI-E) in 
industry. This fell by only 7.8%, even less than total investment in industry between 1989 
and 1991, so that GFI-E in industry rose relative to GDP produced in industry by 42.6% 
between 1989 and 1991! While incomprehensible in the light of a standard Keynesian or 
accelerator model, this fact can be readily understood if we accept that Polish producers 
realized that they needed to fundamentally restructure their technical base.  
  The same "real shocks" approach can explain what happened in agriculture, where 
GFI fell by 62% even though real GDP increased by 6.5% between 1989 and 1991. GFI-E 
in agriculture fell even more - by 76.6%. Producer prices had been kept artificially high in 
the 1980s in agriculture, and farmers were therefore subject to a massive terms of trade 
shock when industrial prices were freed and utility tariffs raised [Bell and Rostowski 1995]. 
Farmers clearly decided that there was not going to be a great future in expanding 
agricultural production under the new market determined conditions. On the other hand in 
commerce - which had been severely repressed under communism and where liberalization 
of prices and entry caused sectoral GDP to grow very fast  - investment grew even faster.  
As a result GFI/GDP in this sector increased by 53% between 1989 and 1993 and GFI-
E/GDP increased by three times during the same period.  
  Finally, it is worth noting that the hypothesis that the depression in Poland in 1990 
was due to a "credit crunch" (Calvo and Coricelli, 1992) is also hard to reconcile with the 
behaviour of investment in that year. Table 7 shows that for the whole economy GFI/GDP 
rose by 1.7%, GFI/GDP in industry rose 18.8%, and GFI-E/GDP in industry rose by 31.8% 
(in industry there was an almost 30% fall in gross output in that year, and yet GFI-E 
actually increased by 2.8% in absolute real terms in this context). Since, on the credit crunch 
hypothesis industrial firms reduced output because they did not have the financial resources 
to buy inputs (particularly material inputs), and indeed were supposedly obliged in this 
situation to "borrow from their employees" by reducing real wages sharply, it is hard to J. Rostowski 
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explain why these same firms should have actually increased the volume of investment in 
machinery and equipment.  
 
6.  Investment and Output in Hungary. 
  Hungary is the other country for which fairly detailed investment and sectoral output 
statistics were obtained (Table 10). The story here has some similarity to that in Poland,  but 
with a clear delay in the "investment recovery" as compared to Poland, so that the ratio of 
GFI/GDP remains several points below its 1989 level from 1990 to 1993 (between 93.5% 
and 97.8% of 1989), and only exceeds that level in 1994 (106.8%).  However this is in spite 
of an 18.3% fall in GDP between 1989 and the trough of the depression in 1993, which 
given western experience would have led us to expect a far larger fall in investment. When 
we look at GFI-E/GDP we again have a pattern which is similar to that in Poland, with 
however the ratios for the economy as a whole exceeding 100% by a significant amount 
only from 1992 (before that date the ratios were slightly above 100% in Poland and slightly 
below 100% in Hungary). This is an extraordinary contrast with the behaviour of gross 
fixed capital formation in machinery and equipment during the Great Depression. We have 
data only for the UK and the USA. However, in the UK where GDP fell by only some 5%, 
GFCF-E had fallen by 33% by 1933, whereas in the USA, where GDP fell by 30%, GFCF-
E fell by 70% (Table 7). Once more this is a puzzle which a demand based explanation of 
the transition depression cannot explain.  
  As in Poland there are wide sectoral differences in the behaviour of GFI and GFI-E, 
and in that of the GFI/GDP and GFI-E/GDP ratios, which suggest that the high level of 
investment was linked to the restructuring of the economy during the transition. The 
"investment recovery" (relative to the 1989 level) only really starts in industry and transport 
in 1992, while in commerce and construction investment is higher than its 1989 level in 
absolute terms throughout the period (in the former case this is similar to Poland, in the 
latter it is not). Most significantly in agriculture, again as in Poland, GFI and GFI-E exhibit 
a continuous and very sharp downward trend, reaching 16% and 15% of their 1989 levels.  
 Investment in Post-communist Economies... 
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7. Transition countries in which Investment fell by more than 
GDP. 
 These are: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Russia and Ukraine. Even in 
these countries, however, the fall in gross investment relative to the fall in national income 
was far smaller than that in any of the countries in our sample from the Great Depression. 
The largest relative fall in investment took place in Russia during 1991-3. During this 
period GDP fell by 29.9%, slightly more than in the USA and Canada in 1929-33, while 
gross investment fell by 53.2% in Russia as against almost 85% in the USA and Canada 
(See Figure 2). This means that the fall in gross investment was only 1.8 times that of the 
fall in national income (compared to a factor of 2.8 times in the USA and Canada). To take 
another comparison: during 1929-32 GDP in Germany fell 23.5% and gross investment fell 
63.5%; during 1990-3 in the Czech Republic, GDP fell 20.6% while gross investment fell 
only 28.2% (both examples run from the peak to the trough of the depression in terms of 
GDP). This gives a ratio of 1.4 for the Czech Republic, only slightly more than half of the 
lowest figure for the sample from the Great Depression.  
 These figures suggest that even in this second group of countries, in which real 
investment did fall by more than real GDP, there may be reason to suppose that the fall in 
output (or part of the fall in output) was due to something other than merely a reduction in 
aggregate demand.  Two possibilities present themselves. First, producers invested as much 
as they could, but were prevented from increasing the share of investment in GDP (in 
constant prices), by the rigour of macroeconomic policies, which simply denied them the 
finance which would have made such investment possible. Alternatively, insufficient 
hardening of budget constraints and insufficient price, trade and other liberalization, made it 
impossible for producers to know what kinds of new capacity they needed (i.e. the prices 
and the macro-economic context were not yet right).  Aggregate data cannot tell us which 
process was at work in which country, although outside information we have about the 
depth of reform suggests that the first process may have operated in the Czech Republic and 
Hungary, and the second in Romania, Russia and Ukraine. 
  J. Rostowski 
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8.  Conclusions and Implications. 
 The behaviour of investment in the post-Communist economies seems to be 
incompatible with the view that the transition depressions were caused exclusively by a 
shortage of aggregate demand. In the case of Poland the behaviour of investment suggests 
that none of the output fall can be attributed to insufficiency of demand. Further research 
needs to be done, particularly on Slovakia and Bulgaria, to see whether the sectoral patterns 
and of investment observed in Poland and Hungary, and the behaviour of investment in 
machinery and equipment in the two countries -- all of which are consistent with the view 
that the resilience of investment was due to restructuring of the economy -- are repeated. 
 It is also important to know: which are the firms which were undertaking this 
investment? Were they state enterprises or new private businesses? As they stand, our 
results cast some doubt on the hypothesis of Grosfeld and Roland (1995) that in the early 
transition enterprises in Central Europe engaged only in "defensive" restructuring and failed 
to undertake "strategic" restructuring. The resilience of investment shows that enterprises 
did more than merely sack workers and sell unneeded plant, which is what defensive 
restructuring amounts to. However, it is not impossible that all the investment was 
undertaken by new private firms, and that Grosfeld and Roland are right as regards the 
behaviour of state enterprises. 
 The investment facts we have described (particularly in the case of Poland) are 
unfriendly to a number of other hypotheses about the transition. We have already mentioned 
that the high level of investment in Poland in 1990 seems incompatible with the "credit 
crunch" hypothesis of Calvo and Coricelli. It is also incompatible with the implications of 
the work of Borensztein and Ostrey (1992) and Borenstein, Demekas and Ostrey (1993), 
which implies that there was very little structural adjustment in the transition economies 
during 1990 and 1991 at the level of the ten major sectors of industry. It has been pointed 
out (e.g. Rostowski 1993) that these results suffer from the level of aggregation of the data 
chosen, whereas the changes in output mix happened either at a higher level of aggregation 
(the shift from industry to commerce and other services) or at a lower level (within 
particular enterprises). The resilience of investment in all transition countries (as compared 
with what one would expect on the basis of experience in western market economies), and Investment in Post-communist Economies... 
CASE Foundation  17
the remarkable resilience of investment in machinery and equipment in Poland and Hungary 
in particular, shows that considerable restructuring was taking place  - otherwise, why invest 
when output has fallen so sharply? 
 J. Rostowski 
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Appendix: 
A back of the envelope calculation of the amount of machinery and equipment which 
had to be written down in Poland after 1989 in the industrial sector can be attempted 
through a calibration of a very simple extension to the accelerator model presented in eq.(2).  
 In order to calculate the equilibrium value of the net capital stock in the form of 
machinery and equipment in 1990 the following procedure was adopted. First it was 
necessary to find the historical value of the net capital stock in M&E in industry in 1989, so 
as to compare this to the level of GDP produced in industry in that year, and thus arrive at a 
guess for the equilibrium ratio of M&E net capital/Y in industry.  
  This was done in the following way. The real gross capital stock in industry (at 1984 
prices) was obtained (Rocznik Statystyczny - hereafter R.S. - 1991 p. 252). The real gross 
capital stock in industry in the form of machinery and equipment was then estimated by 
applying the ratio of the value of machinery and equipment in industry to total capital in 
industry in 1989 at replacement cost (R.S. 1991 p. 256). This ratio was 0.45. The real net 
capital stock of machinery and equipment in industry was then estimated by applying the 
ratio of fully depreciated capital to total capital (stopa zużycia  środk￿w trwałych) of 
machinery and equipment in industry (R.S. 1991 p.258) to the estimate of the real gross 
capital stock in the form of machinery and equipment in industry already obtained. This 
ratio was 0.28. 
  The figure obtained in this way was 1,896 bn zł for the net stock of machinery and 
equipment in industry at 1984 prices, and the level of GDP (in 1984 prices) was 3,773 bn zł 
for 1989. The net K/Y ratio for machinery and equipment in industry in 1989 is thus 0.5. 
We assume that this is the equilibrium value of υ. If we then assume, as is usual, that the 
depreciation rate for machinery and equipment is 10%, and substitute into equation (2), to 
find I* (equilibrium investment), we get (in billions of 1984 złotys): 
(2’)  I* = 0.5(2850 - 3773) + 0.1(1896) =  -270 
as the figure for GDP produced in industry in 1990 at 1984 prices was 2,850 bn zł.  Investment in Post-communist Economies... 
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This indicates that with such parameters, investment in machinery and equipment in 
industry should have been zero in 1990, whereas in fact it was 327 bn zł in 1984 prices. In 
fact, investment in M&E in industry in 1990 should have been zero even if we assume a 
depreciation rate of 0.24 (24% per annum) which is extraordinarily high even for M&E, and 
the level of investment which was actually experienced in 1990 can only be obtained if one 
assumes a depreciation rate of 42% per annum. 
 We can also use the simple accelerator approach to get a very rough idea of the 
amount of M&E capital which had to be written down in industry as a result of the initiation 
of the economic transformation in Poland. GDP generated in industry, which was 2,850 
bnzł in 1990, exceeded 2,800 bn zł (in 1984 prices) only in 1994, so it seems reasonable to 
assume that in 1990 industrial output expected for the foreseeable future was about this 
amount. This gives us an equilibrium capital stock of M&E of about 1,400 bn zł. The 
equilibrium level of investment can also be thought of as given by: 
(3) I  =  λ(K* - K’) + δK’ 
where λ is the proportion of the difference between K* and K’ which is eliminated each 
year, K’ is the true value of the capital stock and K* is the equilibrium capital stock given by  
(4) K*  =  υY* 
where Y* is the equilibrium (expected) level of output. 
By rearranging (3) we get: 
(3’) I  =  λK* + (δ - λ)K’ 
and 
(3’’)  K’ = (I - λK*)/(δ - λ) 
We then get the following values for K’, given the historical I (327 bn zł) and K* 
estimated at 1,400 bn zł: 
             δ = 0.1             δ = 0.2 
        λ = 0.33              574                1015 
        λ = 0.25              133                  400 J. Rostowski 
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Given that the historical amount of capital (in M&E in industry at 1984 prices) in 1989 
was 1896 bn zł, the amount of this capital which needed to be written down in 1990 can be 
calculated to have been as follows: 
             δ = 0.1             δ = 0.2 
        λ = 0.33              70%                48% 
        λ = 0.25              93%                79% 
 
If λ = 0.33, then there is no write down of M&E capital in industry only if δ = 0.26; 
and if  λ = 0.25 then the same result  occurs if δ = 0.24. However, since it seems very 
improbable that δ should be any larger than 0.20, or even less that λ should be any larger 
than 0.33, we can suppose that the amount of machinery and equipment which needed to be 
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Notes: 
1. There are other more obvious reasons to reject the idea of insufficient aggregate demand in 
Romania, Russia and Ukraine. In all three macroeconomic policy was very lax for most of the first 
two years of the transition, during which output fell very sharply. 
2. For the period 1954-89, quarterly data. Non-residential structures and residential investment 
(overwhelmingly structures) were also correlated with GNP, but not quite so strongly. 
3. Also quarterly. Unless otherwise stated all data is in real terms. 
4. Continuous comparable data was not available for investment in Eurostat. 
5. Investment demand could also fall as a result of a decline in the "animal spirits" of entrepreneurs. 
6. Data from 1930 was available for Japan, but that country experienced no fall in national income. 
7. Data on real GFCF and GFCF in M&E are not available. 
8. GFCF is unavailable for Germany. 
9. GFCF fell 14% and gross fixed capital formation of machinery and equipment fell even more: by 
22.8%. 
10. While GFCF fell 47.5%. 
11. "Industry" in Poland consists of the usual manufacturing two digit sectors plus extractive 
industry, which accounts for less than 5% of the whole.  Investment in Post-communist Economies... 
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Table 1: United States;  Correlations of real GDP and gross value added with gross 
fixed capital formation (Quarterly Data) 
  Volatility       
(% st dev) 
t-1 t  t+1 
GDP  1.71 0.85 1.00  0.85 
Investment  Expenditure  8.30 0.79 0.91  0.75 
Fixed  Investment  5.38 0.83 0.90  0.81 
Equipment  6.21 0.65 0.85  0.90 
Source: Kydland, F. & Prescott, E.: Business Cycles: Real Facts and Monetary Myth, 
Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 
 
Table 2: United Kingdom: Correlations of real GDP and gross value added with 
gross fixed capital formation (Quarterly Data) 
  Volatility        
(% st dev) 
t-1 t  t+1 
Output 1.49  -  -  - 
Total Investment  6.69  0.51  0.74  0.58 
Fixed Investment  3.48  0.36  0.64  0.55 
Inventory Investment  0.82  0.47  0.59  0.43 
Source: Blackburn, K. & Ravn, M. O.: Business Cycles in the United Kingdom: Facts and 
Fictions, Economica, 59, 383-401. 
 
Table 3: France: Correlations of real GDP and gross value added with gross fixed 
capital formation (Yearly Data) 
  Volatility        
(% st dev) 
t-1 t  t+1 
Gross Domestic Product  1.59  0.38  1.00  0.38 
- Gross Fixed Capital Formation  4.43  0.39  0.76  0.34 
- Gross Fixed Capital Formation in    
Machinery & Equipment 
6.12 0.31 0.69 0.23 
- Gross Value Added -Manufacturing  3.00  0.37  0.92  0.36 
Gross Value Added - Manufacturing  3.00  0.41  1.00  0.41 
- Gross Fixed Capital Formation - 
Manufacturing 
8.25 -0.23 0.30 -0.03 
Gross Value Added - Construction  3.07  0.16  1.00  0.16 
- Gross Fixed Capital Formation - 
Construction 
7.37 0.05 0.45 0.05 
Gross Value Added - Agriculture  5.67  -0.30  1.00  -0.30 
- Gross Fixed Capital Formation -
Agriculture 
9.44 -0.21 0.05 -0.12 
Source: Eurostat Investment in Post-communist Economies... 
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Table 4: Germany: Correlations of real GDP and gross value added with gross fixed 
capital formation (Yearly Data) 
  Volatility         
(% st dev) 
t-1 t  t+1 
Gross Domestic Product  2.02  0.28  1.00  0.28 
- Gross Fixed Capital Formation  6.09  0.31  0.51  0.13 
- Gross Fixed Capital Formation in 
Machinery & Equipment 
8.59 0.34 0.36  -0.06 
- Gross Value Added - 
Manufacturing 
2.76 -0.04 0.86 0.19 
Gross Value Added - Manufacturing   2.76  -0.10  1.00  -0.10 
- Gross Fixed Capital Formation - 
Manufacturing 
9.79 -0.09 0.08 0.12 
Gross Value Added - Construction   4.20  0.38  1.00  0.38 
- Gross Fixed Capital Formation - 
Construction 
16.32 0.67 0.65 0.10 
Gross Value Added - Agriculture   6.94  -0.06  1.00  -0.60 
- Gross Fixed Capital Formation - 
Agriculture 
9.40 -0.07 0.08 0.12 
Source: Eurostat J. Rostowski 
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Table 5: Italy: Correlations of real GDP and gross value added with gross fixed 
capital formation (Yearly Data) 
  Volatility         
(% st dev) 
t-1 t  t+1 
Gross Domestic Product  2.3  0.08  1.00  0.08 
- Grossed Fixed Capital Formation  4.8  -0.04  0.68  0.31 
- Gross Fixed Capital Formation in 
Machinery & Equipment 
8.6 0.12 0.70 0.13 
- Gross Value Added in 
Manufacturing 
4.6 -0.04 0.94 -0.23 
Gross Value Added in Manufacturing  4.6  -0.23  1.00  -0.23 
- Gross Fixed Capital Formation in 
Manufacturing 
10.1 -0.20 0.63 0.22 
Gross Value Added - Construction   2.9  0.21  1.00  0.21 
- Gross Fixed Capital Formation - 
Construction 
6.0 0.02 0.43 0.25 
Gross Value Added - Agriculture   4.0  -0.30  1.00  -0.30 
- Gross Fixed Capital Formation - 
Agriculture 
6.4 -0.41 -0.02 0.20 
Source: Eurostat 
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Table 6: United Kingdom: Correlations of real GDP and gross value added with 
gross fixed capital formation (Yearly Data) 
  Volatility         
(% st dev) 
t-1 t  t+1 
Gross Domestic Product  2.5  0.33  1.00  0.33 
- Grossed Fixed Capital Formation  5.8  0.27  0.78  0.44 
- Gross Fixed Capital Formation in 
Machinery & Equipment 
7.3 0.37 0.78 0.35 
- Gross Value Added in 
Manufacturing 
4.3 0.19 0.86 0.42 
Gross Value Added in Manufacturing  4.3  0.40  1.00  0.40 
- Gross Fixed Capital Formation in 
Manufacturing 
15.3 0.18 0.64 0.50 
- Gross Fixed Capital Formation in 
Equipment - Manufacturing 
10.4 -0.14 0.61 0.65 
Gross Value Added - Construction   6.1  0.32  1.00  0.32 
- Gross Fixed Capital Formation - 
Construction 
5.9 -0.06 0.25 0.25 
Gross Value Added - Agriculture   6.9  -0.40  1.00  -0.40 
- Gross Fixed Capital Formation - 
Agriculture 
16.3 0.19 0.08  -0.37 
Source: Eurostat 
 J. Rostowski 
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Table 7: Volume Indices (part I) 
Years 1929  1930  1931  1932  1933 
Australia    
GDP 100,00 90,59 92,12 97,61  101,26 
Gross investment  100,00 71,89 55,33 56,21  80,47 
Gross capital formation  100,00 72,38 52,49 50,28  70,17 
GI/GDP 100,00 79,36 60,06 57,59  79,47 
GFCF/GDP 100,00 100,67 94,87 89,44  87,19 
Germany    
GDP 100,00 93,79 84,36 76,47  84,13 
Production of investment goods*  100,00 81,50 56,48 38,08  49,75 
PIG/GDP 100,00 86,90 66,95 49,80  59,14 
Italy    
GDP 100,00 92,96 94,37 97,89  97,89 
Gross investment  100,00 72,01 63,06 72,76  66,04 
GI/GDP 100,00 77,47 66,83 74,33  67,47 
Canada    
GDP 100,00 95,73 83,57 74,89  69,91 
Gross investment  100,00 71,61 50,35 22,47  15,55 
Gross capital formation  100,00 87,51 64,99 36,01  25,75 
GI/GDP 100,00 74,81 60,25 30,00  22,24 
GFCF/GDP 100,00 91,42 77,77 48,08  36,84 
Sweden    
GDP 100,00 103,40 93,53 91,12  92,28 
Gross investment  100,00 115,58 99,43 77,24  79,69 
GI/GDP 100,00 111,78 106,31 84,78  86,36 
UK    
GDP 100,00 99,90 94,85 95,04  96,18 
Gross investment   100,00 87,20 94,08 82,48  76,80 
Gross capital formation  100,00 100,83 98,33 85,83  89,17 
GFCF in machinery & 
equipment 
100,00 92,90 95,85 77,19 67,24 
GI/GDP 100,00 87,28 99,19 86,79  79,85 
GFCF/GDP 100,00 100,93 103,68 90,31  92,71 
GFCF in M&E/GDP  100,00 92,99 101,05 81,22  69,91 
Notes: see next page. 
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Table 7: Volume Indices (part II) 
Years 1929  1930  1931  1932  1933 
US    
GDP 100,00 90,59 82,88 71,76  70,25 
Gross investment  100,00 70,04 43,25 16,24  16,38 
Gross capital formation  100,00 76,64 52,41 30,37  26,09 
Gross capital formation in M&E  100,00 80,00 51,43 29,61  30,13 
GI/GDP 100,00 77,32 52,18 22,63  23,32 
GFCF/GDP 100,00 84,60 63,24 42,33  37,14 
GFCF in M&E/GDP  100,00 88,31 62,05 41,26  42,89 
Source: Liesner, T.; "One Hundred Years of Economic Statistics", The Economist, 1984, 
London. 
*I. Svermilson, "Growth and Stagnation in the European Economy", UNECE, 1954, 
Geneva. 
Table 8: Other Central and East European Countries - Volume Indices (1989=100) 
  1989   1990   1991   1992   1993  
Gross Domestic Product    
Czech Republic  100.0   98.8  84.8  78.8  78.4  
Slovakia  100.0   97.5  86.6  80.5  76.7  
Bulgaria  100.0   88.2  68.0  62.4  58.7  
Romania  100.0   91.6  79.7  67.7  68.3  
Russia  100.0   98.0  85.4  68.8  59.9  
Ukraine  100.0   97.4  86.5  73.5  61.8  
Gross Investment    
Czech Republic  100.0   93.5 68.4 75.0 67.1 
Slovakia  100.0   105.3  89.6  109.1  106.5  
Bulgaria  100.0   81.5  65.3  64.3  59.2  
Romania  100.0   61.7  45.8  45.3  44.9  
Russia  100.0   100.1  83.9  46.2  39.3  
Ukraine  100.0   101.9  96.5  57.9  44.6  
GI/GDP    
Czech Republic    100.0  94.6 80.7 95.2 85.6 
Slovakia  100.0   108.0  103.5  135.5  138.9  
Bulgaria  100.0   92.4  96.0  103.0  100.9  
Romania  100.0   67.4  57.5  66.9  65.7  
Russia  100.0   102.1  98.2  67.2  65.6  
Ukraine  100.0   104.6  111.6  78.8  72.2  
Source: Poland: International Economic Report 1993/4, World Economy Research 
Institute, Warsaw School of Economics, 1994. J. Rostowski 
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Table 9: Poland - Volume Indices (1989=100) 
  1987   1988   1989   1990   1991   1992   1993  
Gross Domestic Product  95.9   99.8  100.0  88.4  81.7  82.9   86.1 
  - industry  97.7   102.1  100.0  78.0  64.6  66.3   70.3 
  - construction  94.6   100.3  100.0  85.5  91.3  94.7   96.6 
  - agriculture  97.6   99.0  100.0  99.7  106.5  93.4   98.0 
  - transport  95.4   99.0  100.0  85.2  68.2  68.9   67.3 
  - commerce  89.3   95.5  100.0  100.7  108.7  108.5   121.5 
Gross Fixed Investment  97.2   102.4  100.0  89.9  86.2  86.8   88.7 
  - industry  87.8   91.7  100.0  92.7  86.0  81.9   83.8 
  - construction  115.6   129.0  100.0  72.8  98.0  155.3   109.0 
  - agriculture  106.0   109.5  100.0  67.0  38.2  34.1   38.6 
  - transport  131.8   145.6  100.0  100.5  93.1  78.4   71.3 
  - commerce  82.2   85.2  100.0  97.7  111.5  151.5   185.9 
GFI/GDP  101.4   102.6  100.0  101.7  105.5  104.6   103.1 
  - industry  89.9   89.8  100.0  118.8  133.1  123.5   119.1 
  - construction  122.2   128.7  100.0  85.2  107.4  163.9   112.9 
  - agriculture  108.7   110.6  100.0  67.2  35.8  36.6   39.4 
  - transport  138.1   147.1  100.0  118.0  136.5  113.8   106.0 
  - commerce  92.0   89.2  100.0  97.0  102.6  139.7   153.0 
Gross fixed investment in machinery & equipment  
  - total  99.1   105.5  100.0  90.2  82.3  94.3   110.1 
  - industry  83.3   89.5  100.0  102.8  92.2  96.4   101.5 
  - construction  125.5   139.1  100.0  66.4  67.9  133.8   109.0 
  - agriculture  107.6   113.2  100.0  61.2  23.4  15.7   18.4 
  - transport  147.3   155.1  100.0  64.1  67.3  54.8   60.8 
  - commerce  102.4   102.4  100.0  106.6  156.3  271.8   368.9 
Gross fixed investment in machinery & equipment / GDP    
  - total  103.4   105.7  100.0  102.0  100.7  113.6   127.9 
  - industry  85.3   87.6  100.0  131.8  142.6  145.4   144.4 
  - construction  132.6   138.8  100.0  77.6  74.4  141.2   112.9 
  - agriculture  110.3   114.4  100.0  61.4  21.9  16.8   18.8 
  - transport  154.3   156.7  100.0  75.2  98.7  79.5   90.4 
  - commerce  114.6   107.1  100.0  105.8  143.8  250.5   303.6 
Gross fixed investment in 
buildings in industry 
92.7   94.6  100.0  87.1  84.4  72.5   66.5 
Gross fixed investment in 
buildings in industry/GDP in 
industry 
94.9   92.6  100.0  111.7  130.6  109.3   94.6 
Source: Rocznik Statystyczny. Gł￿wny Urząd Statystyczny, various issues. Investment in Post-communist Economies... 
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Table 10: Hungary - Volume Indices (1989=100) 
  1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 
Gross  Domestic  Product 99.39 99.31  100.00 96.46 84.98 82.40 81.70 83.34
-  industry  103.59 102.01 100.00 92.32 75.81 70.75  73.86 
-  construction  97.67 92.35  100.00 78.10 66.39 67.64 63.28 
-  agriculture  93.79 101.21 100.00 95.32 87.49 72.98  68.06 
-  transport  92.35 93.57  100.00 92.67 82.08 78.51 74.49 
-  commerce  116.46 101.35 100.00 111.77 102.44 85.89  81.44 
Gross  Fixed  Investment  100.54 92.83  100.00 90.37 79.44 78.11 79.92 88.98
-  industry  98.57  91.34 100.00 92.15 79.47 109.24 100.97 
-  construction  79.17  81.53 100.00 103.14 122.50 109.53 113.36 
-  agriculture  137.17 107.13 100.00 83.42 47.77 17.16  15.92 
-  transport  105.67 104.64 100.00 91.27 96.02 133.59 158.49 
-  commerce  76.69  72.02 100.00 106.69 110.44 135.21 115.02 
GFI / GDP  101.16  93.48  100.00 93.68 93.48 94.80  97.82  106.76
-  industry  95.15  89.54 100.00 99.82 104.82 154.40 136.71 
-  construction  81.05  88.29 100.00 132.05 184.53 161.94 179.14 
-  agriculture  146.26 105.85 100.00 87.51 54.60 23.51  23.39 
-  transport  114.41 111.83 100.00 98.48 116.99 170.15 212.78 
-  commerce  65.85  71.05 100.00 95.46 107.82 157.41 141.24 
Gross fixed investment in machinery & equipment               
-  total  102.34  93.98 100.00 93.20 79.97 101.75 102.97 121.90
- industry    88.26  100.00 94.58 78.23 144.19   
- construction    90.49  100.00 80.70 59.09 75.88   
-  agriculture   105.15 100.00 87.55 52.53 14.98   
-  transport   110.46 100.00 83.04 84.45 122.41   
- commerce    85.23  100.00 138.68 131.23 174.89   
Gross fixed investment in machinery & equipment / GDP               
-  total  102.96  94.64 100.00 96.62 94.11 123.49 126.04 146.27
- industry    86.52  100.00 102.45 103.19 203.79   
- construction    97.99  100.00 103.32 89.01 112.19   
-  agriculture   103.89 100.00 91.85 60.04 20.53   
-  transport   118.05 100.00 89.60 102.89 155.92   
- commerce    84.09  100.00 124.07 128.11 203.60   
Sources:  
1. Yearbook of Economic Statistics 1989-91, KSH Budapest;  
2. National Accounts Hungary 1990-93, KSH Budapest;  
3. Statistical Yearbook 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993, KSH Budapest;  
4. National Bank of Hungary, Annual Report, 1990, 1991, 1992, 1993. 